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T1E COURT 6P APPEALs, 1954 TAURM
Service Commission). The Court was also of the opinion that the prayer for
injunctive relief compelling the acquisition of new machinery could be more
adequately handled by the Public Service Commission, and that a prohibitory
0 7
injunction would interfere with the defendant's duty to collect the taxes.
The dissenters would have allowed the complaint to stand as to the causes of
action for injunction and declaratory judgment. The lower courts had not, in their
discretion, dismissed 8 and the dissenters were of the opinion that a controversy
existed, the issue being not whether the phone calls were taxable but whether the
defendant could continue to force its subscribers to pay taxes not due and require
those subscribers to submit to the company's private procedures as to refunds. They
also thought direct application to the courts for injunctive relief was available here,
on the ground that where plaintiff alleges illegal collection by a public utility of
taxes not statutorily authorized, direct application for relief may be made to the
Court."9

Dead Man Statute
In a suit against the estate of plaintiff's putative father, based upon an
alleged oral contract to support the plaintiff made between plaintiff's alleged father
and maternal grandmother, the Court held, the mother was a competent witness
and the grandmother an incompetent witness under New York Civil Practice
Act §347.70 The interest which renders a witness incompetent under this section
is only such as results from the direct legal operation of the judgment. 1 Therefore,
although the effect of the agreement would be to lift from the mother the financial
burden of the child's support, her testimony is admissible.7 2
The Court's conclusion as to the competency of the grandmother was based
upon the general principle that where a person sues on a contract made for his
benefit he derives his interest from the party who furnishes the consideration.7 3
This general rule has at times been departed from,74 but for the most part has been
followed and is firmly entrenched as part of the law of this state.7 5 The dissenters
67. Administrative Code of City of New York §N41-2.0.
68. Note 65, supra.
69. Kovarslcy v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 279 N. Y. 304, 18 N. E. 2d 287 (1938).
The majority distinguished this case on the ground that here the company claimed
the right to collect and retain the money collected.
70. Duncan v. Clarke, 308 N. Y. 282, 125 N. E. 2d 569 (1955).
71. Hobartv. Hobart,62 N. Y. 80 (1875).
72. Connelly v. O'Conner, 117 N. Y. 91, 22 N. E. 753 (1889).
73. Rosseau v. Rouss, 180 N. Y. 116, 72 N. E. 916 (1904).
74. Ward v. N. Y. Life Ins. Go, 225 N. Y. 314, 122 N. E. 207 (1917).
75. Croker v. N. Y. Trust Co., 245 N Y. 17, 156 N E. 81 (1927); Matter of Browning's Estate, 280 N. Y. 584, 20 N. E. 2d 25 (1939).
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were of the opinion that this case was within an exception to the general rule."
This opinion was based on the contention that the Rosseau case"7 did not overrule
the prior cases as the majority claimed, so that those cases were still part of the
law of this state and thus constituted exceptions to the Rosseaue doctrine. This contention seems erroneous in the light of Chief Justice Cullen's concurring opinion
in the Rosseaa case, in which he anticipated the confusion which would be caused

by the failure of the majority to explicitly overrule these earlier cases.
Proof of Consideration
In an action on a letter promising to pay a sum of money on behalf of a
third party debtor, defendant corporation alleged failure of consideration. Plaintiff
claimed that the consideration was forbearance to sue the debtor, and that this
fact was made known to defendant's officer by a telephone conversation between
the debtor and the officer. The Court, (unanimously affirming a unanimous Appellate Division,"s which had reversed the trial court) 79 held, there was sufficient
evidence that defendant's officer was in fact the party at the other end of the
telephone conversation, and thus knew of the consideration. 0
The quantum of proof necessary to establish this fact was held to be met by,
inter alia, testimony of plaintiff's lawyer that the debtor had made the telephone
call in his presence, pursuant to a discussion they had had on this matter, had
referred to a page in a little notebook on which defendant's officer's name and
telephone number appeared, asked for defendant's officer by name, relayed the
instructions which plaintiff's attorney wished to be given to defendant, including
the information as to forbearance, and that subsequently the defendant had acted
in accordance with the instructions.
This case is to be distinguished from those in which what was said on the
other end of a telephone wire was a vital factor in the case; 8' here, all that was
necessary was that the other party heard the information. A subsidiary point was
the admission in evidence of an office memorandum made by plaintiff's lawyer's
secretary in the ordinary course of business,8 2 purporting to report a telephone call
76. Healy v. Healy, 55 App. Div. 315, 66 N. Y. Supp. 927 (4th Dep't 1900); afI'd,
166 N. Y. 624, 60 N. E. 1112 (1901); Bouton v. Welch, 170 N. Y. 554, 63 N. E. 539
(1902).

77. See note 73, supra.

78. 284 App. Div. 703, 134 N. Y. S. 2d 562 (1st Dep't 1954).
79. 205 Misc. 958, 131 N. Y. S. 2d 244 (1954).
80. Ruegg v. Fairfield Securities Corporation,308 N. Y. 313, 125 N. E. 2d 585
(1955).

81. Gubelman v. Ands Koch, Inc., 234 N. Y. 425, 138 N. E. 81 (1923).
82. See C. P. A. §374 (a).

